The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of corruption on bank lending in Russia. This issue is of major interest in order to understand the causes of financial underdevelopment and the effects of corruption in Russia. We use regional measures of corruption and bank-level data to perform this investigation. Our main estimations show that corruption hampers bank lending in Russia. We investigate whether this negative role of corruption is influenced by the degree of bank risk aversion, but find no effect. The detrimental effect of corruption is only observed for loans to households and firms, in opposition to loans to government. Additional controls confirm the detrimental impact of corruption on bank lending. Therefore, our results provide motivations to fight corruption to favor bank lending in Russia.
Introduction
The evidence of corruption in Russia is difficult to refute. Transparency International's 2007 Corruption Perception Index ranked Russia 143 rd out of the 179 countries surveyed, making it the second-most corrupt country in Europe after
Belarus. Confounding the scholarly intuition that the corruption that has plagued Russia since Chekhov's time should decline with economic prosperity (Shleifer and Treisman, 2000) , it appears instead that corruption has thrived unabated during Russia's recent economic resurgence. 2 While corruption in courts is expected to have a negative impact on bank lending, the role of corruption in lending is not straightforward. It can be considered as a financing obstacle, as it acts as a tax that increases the cost of the loan to the borrower. However, while the latter argument assumes that the bribe is required by the bank official, the borrower may take the initiative to propose a bribe to enhance his chances to obtain a loan. Furthermore, the impact of corruption on bank lending may vary with the type of borrowers, and corruption may consequently influence the breakdown of bank lending between types of borrowers. Thus, we might well ask Levin and Satarov (2000, p.113) conclude that corruption in Russia is an endemic phenomenon that has "become a commonplace theme in discussions of the Russian economy."
The aim of this paper is to investigate the impact of corruption on bank lending in Russia. Our hypothesis is that a high level of corruption discourages banks from engaging in lending. Greater corruption adds to uncertainty of judicial decisions for banks, as they cannot count on the courts to enforce damages recoveries for losses or deficiency judgments against defaulting debtors, and consequently banks are expected to refrain from lending. However corruption is not limited to the misuse of public office as underlined by its common definition provided by Transparency
International: "the misuse of entrusted power for private gain". It can also take place in lending through bribes given to bank officials to receive a loan, as observed by Levin and Satarov (2000) in Russia. 2 Russia's TI Corruption Perception Index scores were the same in 2001 and 2007. whether corruption, associated with ill-functioning institutions, exerts the same influence on bank lending to government entities as to other borrowers. We examine these issues using data on corruption in 40 Russian regions from the Transparency International (TI) and Information for Democracy Foundation (INDEM) survey conducted in 2002. Detailed data on banks are drawn from the Interfax database.
Our work then contributes to understand the causes of financial development and of the effects of corruption in Russia, i.e. both fundamental issues for the economic development of the country. First, bank lending remains stunningly low with a ratio of domestic credit to GDP equal to 25.7% in 2005, compared to a world average of 55.8% (EBRD, 2006) . Given that a positive relationship between bank lending and growth has long been noted in the literature (e.g. Levine and Zervos, 1998 ; Levine, Loayza and Beck, 2000) , the need for investigating the determinants of bank lending in Russia is self-evident. We ask, therefore, how endemic corruption has played a role in stunting development of bank lending in Russia.
Second, as notably observed by Shleifer and Treisman (2000) , there is a commonly accepted view that corruption hampers economic development in Russia, which relies on the cross-country studies showing the detrimental effects of corruption on economic development (Mauro, 1995; Méon and Sekkat, 2005 ). Yet this consensus has emerged in the absence of studies that actually establish and specify the detriments of corruption in Russia Next to its relevance for Russia, this study brings also significant insights for several strands of literature. By focusing on the impact on bank lending, it analyzes an unexplored effect of corruption. Indeed, in spite of the growing literature on corruption, no study has ever studied the impact of corruption on bank lending. This work also relates to studies investigating the role of legal institutions on the size of credit markets at the macro level (La Porta et (Treisman, 2000) . The use of a national framework allows for teasing out of specific economic effects of corruption on bank lending. Indeed, Svensson (2005) discusses the econometric problems in cross-country analyses of the effects of corruption resulting from omitted variables. Our single-country framework is not subject to these constraints.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents evidence and literature on corruption in Russia. Section III develops the arguments on the role of corruption on bank lending. Section IV presents the data and variables and section V considers the results. Concluding remarks appear in section VI.
II. Corruption in Russia
In reviewing corruption of the judiciary, Blass (2007) Their argument is somewhat finessed: they do not say corruption is not detrimental to growth, rather they suggest that the detrimental effects of corruption may sometimes be insufficient to overwhelm positive influences from other determinants of growth.
In summary, we note that while the presence of corruption in courts and lending in Russia is acknowledged, there has been little investigation into the economic consequences of this phenomenon. By analyzing the role of corruption on bank lending in Russia, we start to fill this gap in our understanding.
III. Linkages of corruption and bank lending
loan. Therefore, the institutions that empower the bank to proceed to these actions exert an influence on its lending behavior. As corruption adds to uncertainty for banks to enforce their claims against defaulting borrowers, it diminishes the willingness of banks to grant loans.
Empirical evidence supports the role of laws on the books and law enforcement on bank lending. While La Porta et al. (1997) observe that better legal protection for creditors contributes to larger debt markets, Levine (1998 Levine ( , 1999 resulting from ex ante information asymmetry between the bank and the borrower, causes credit rationing (i.e. loan applications from borrowers willing to pay more than the loan rate charged by the bank are rejected). The bank is motivated to do so to avoid adverse selection that results in attracting only bad borrowers. Nevertheless, the existence of credit rationing suggests that some borrowers are willing to pay more than the official loan rate to obtain credit. As a consequence, they have incentive to bribe bank officials to obtain the loan.
may have been granted following bribes given by borrowers to obtain a loan.
Furthermore, our own computations on the WBES dataset for Russia show that 58.13% of Russian firm managers did not perceive corruption of bank officials as an obstacle to the growth of their business.
From an empirical perspective, the only paper to our knowledge providing estimations on the role of corruption on bank lending is the investigation of Detragiache, Tressel and Gupta (2008) into the role of foreign bank penetration on bank credit. This work considers corruption as a control variable and finds a negative association with bank credit.
IV. Data and variables
We describe our measures of corruption and our bank-level variables in turn. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for all variables.
IV.1 Corruption data
To measure corruption, we use the survey conducted by Transparency
International and the Information for Democracy Foundation to measure differences in corruption levels across Russia in 2002. 6 The measure for perception is consistent with the Transparency International CPI score, which is widely used in cross-country comparisons and empirical studies 
IV.2 Bank-level data and control variables
We obtain quarterly bank-level data from the financial information agency 
V. Results
This section presents our results for the impact of corruption on bank lending.
We start with the main estimations, and then look at whether bank risk aversion influences the relationship between corruption and bank lending. Next, we consider corruption effects for various borrower groups. Finally, we perform some robustness check tests.
V.1 Main estimations
We perform regressions of bank lending on a set of variables, including a measure of corruption. We use alternatively both measures of corruption and two combinations of control variables (with and without the region-level control variables)
to check the sensitivity of the results. These results are displayed in Table 2 .
The key finding is the negative coefficient of Corruption, which is significant at 1% level. This result is observed when the corruption variable is Perception or Amount, which shows that it is not dependent on the measure of corruption. It is robust to the set of control variables as the presence of the regional control variables does not affect this finding. The indication is that corruption hampers bank lending.
variables for foreign and public ownership are both significantly negative. Controlling for the size and age of the bank, this finding indicates foreign and public banks lend less than domestic private banks.
Bank Concentration is not significant, suggesting that bank lending is not influenced by the degree of concentration of the banking industry. Finally, Per Capita Income is significantly negative, which is in line with the view that greater economic development negatively influences bank lending. This may appear counter-intuitive at first glance, given that the literature on the finance-growth nexus generally finds a positive association between economic and financial development (e.g. Levine and Zervos, 1998 ). Yet this depressing effect on lending is widely observed at the country level when we perform bank-level estimations. Of course, this finding could be intrinsic to Russia, making it hard to compare against studies elsewhere. To our best knowledge, no other studies have investigated the finance-growth nexus on Russian data.
V.2 The impact of risk aversion of banks

Even if corruption hampers bank lending, it is not clear that this effect is
sensitive to the degree of bank risk aversion. Indeed corruption may be initiated by the borrower willing to enhance his chances to obtain a loan. One would expect to find this behavior more commonplace when banks display greater risk aversion, i.e. are more reluctant to grant loans. Indeed this reluctance diminishes the chances of obtaining a loan for the borrower and motivates him to offer a bribe. Therefore, even if the overall effect of corruption on bank lending is detrimental, we need to determine whether it is weakened by the presence of greater risk aversion on the part of banks.
To investigate this, we turn to a second set of estimations of the risk aversion of banks. Risk aversion is measured by the difference between the value of the capital adequacy ratio (N1) and the requirement for this ratio. Capital adequacy ratio is defined as the ratio of the bank's equity capital to the overall risk-weighted assets minus the sum of the reserves created for depreciation of securities and possible losses. The minimum level of this ratio required by banking regulation depends on the amount of the bank's equity: in 2002, the requirements were 10% for banks with equity above €5 million, and 11% for other banks. While a few studies use the ratio of equity to total assets as a measure of risk aversion of banks (e.g. Maudos and The results of these estimations are displayed in Table 3 . Note that the coefficient of Corruption is negative even if it only remains significant when the measure of corruption based on amount is used. Furthermore, the coefficient of Risk Aversion is significantly negative, which jives with the intuitive view that risk-averse banks lend less. We do not, however, find that the interaction term Corruption × Risk Aversion is significantly positive. This finding supports the view that the negative impact of corruption on bank lending is not influenced by the degree of bank risk aversion. In other words, the hypothesis that corruption may be less detrimental on bank lending by relaxing the reluctance of banks to grant loans is not supported.
V.3 Estimations by category of loans
We now ask whether corruption may affect different groups of borrowers differently, and even favor some borrowers over others.
Specifically, we test the assumption that corruption is less detrimental for lending to government entities than other borrowers. This assumption is based on two mechanisms.
First, corruption should exert an impact on bank lending by increasing the uncertainty of banks about enforcing their claims against defaulting borrowers.
Therefore, this effect is expected to play a greater role for borrowers when the degree of information asymmetries is higher from the bank's perspective. As observed by Haselmann and Wachtel (2006) , these asymmetries should be weaker when banks lend money to government entities than to other borrowers as the ability of the government to tax means a lower default risk, which, in turn, leads to lower requirements for the bank to gather information. Thus, we expect a weaker detrimental effect of corruption on bank lending to government entities.
Second, corruption is associated with institutional inefficiencies, so we ask whether corruption also exerts an impact on loans to government entities through public pressure to satisfy their financing needs. Our dataset allows such investigation as it includes information on loans by borrower type: households, firms, and government (i.e. federal, regional and local entities).
We rerun our estimations considering the logarithm of each category of loans as the explained variable. The results appear in Table 4 (Perception corruption variable)
and Table 5 (Amount corruption variable). We observe the coefficient for Corruption is negative in estimations explaining loans to households and loans to firms, with a significant sign in most cases. This indicates corruption hampers bank lending to households and to firms. The most striking finding here concerns the positive coefficient for Corruption in estimations explaining loans to government, which is significant in most cases. It suggests corruption favors bank lending to government, and is thus not detrimental for all borrowers. As mentioned above, lower information asymmetries when lending to government entities may explain why these borrowers are less affected by corruption, but it does not explain the positive impact. One possibility is that ill-functioning institutions with dishonest civil servants are extorting money from banks. In any case, the positive impact of corruption on bank lending to government should not be interpreted as a benefit. Unlike bank lending as a whole, bank lending to government does not favor economic development. Further, it is reasonable to postulate that increased bank lending to government entities diverts lending resources away from more appropriate borrowers in terms of economic development.
For the rest, we observe similar results for the control variables in most cases with two interesting exceptions. Age is significantly negative when loans to government are explained, suggesting that younger banks grant more loans to government. Moreover, the share of deposits to assets, which was significantly negative in our main estimations, is differently connected to each category of loans: negatively significant for loans to firms, positively significant for loans to households, and not significant for loans to government. As loans to firms represent the majority of customer loans (88.76%), our result from the main initial estimations was driven by these loans. However, we observe that banks that rely more on deposits tend to lend more loans to households. This is an intuitive result, as these banks are expected to have more households in their client base.
V.4 Robustness checks
Having tested the robustness of this result to alternative measures of corruption and different sets of control variables, we now check the robustness of this finding in other ways.
We use an alternative variable to measure the extent to which banks grant credit: the share of loans in total assets. This considers the importance of lending in the activities of the bank, and takes the size of the bank into account. The estimations are given in Table 6 . Note that the coefficient of Corruption remains significantly negative while the control variables are unaffected.
Another potential distortion in the results could come from the fact that about half of the banks surveyed were located in the Moscow region and thus makes the level of corruption in the Moscow region determinative. We revise our estimations by considering only banks outside the Moscow region to check whether our findings are preserved. Results presented in Table 7 show that the detrimental effect of corruption on bank lending is not affected by the restriction of the sample to non-Moscow banks,
as Corruption remains significantly negative. We observe that the coefficients of control variables are slightly affected with notably a non-significant coefficient for foreign ownership, which can be explained by the small number of foreign banks outside the Moscow region.
VI. Concluding remarks
In this paper, we examined the role of corruption on bank lending in Russia using regional data for corruption and bank-level data for lending. Overall, we found corruption diminishes bank lending. Further, the detrimental effect is not weakened when the risk aversion of banks is taken into account. Estimations by type of borrowers showed that corruption favors lending to government entities over lending to households and firms. This latter finding is not necessarily good news as it may indicate institutional susceptibility to public pressure to grant bank loans and divert bank lending away from more appropriate and economically beneficial uses.
Our overall conclusion is that corruption is detrimental to bank lending in Russia. Corruption adds to uncertainty for banks; it reduces their trust in courts and acts as tax on loans for borrowers. These findings provide a better understanding of the causes of Russia's financial underdevelopment and the consequences of corruption. As bank credit has generally been shown to favor growth, these results should give Russian officials an economic incentive to fight corruption actively rather than give in to the widely held view that economic growth in itself will lead to lower corruption levels.
Our analysis could be extended in a number of ways. For example, information on the connections between banks and borrowers could, in the line of Khwaja and Mian (2005) , be gathered to investigate the presence of connected lending in Russia.
Studies could also be performed for other countries to establish whether the effects of corruption on bank lending are not exclusive to Russia. 
